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WAITING FOR CREDENTIALS: FEMINIST
THEORIES OF ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
ELIZABETH K. SPAHN*
Feminist analysis begins with the recognition that each of us views
human rights through a different set of lenses depending on our
place in society.'
Waiting for credentials in the sweltering Saharan summer, I began to
chat with a young Arabic woman, ajournalist who had been trying for
two days to obtain her press pass to cover the U.N. International
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, Egypt. Well
educated, quick witted, and articulate, her English was perfect, which
greatly facilitated the conversation as my Arabic is nonexistent. We
chatted amiably about the heat, the lines, terrorist threats,2 security
checkpoints, and the need for more women in positions of power
before the conversation turned to the issues of the population
conference.
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. My thanks to Reed Boland, Judi
Greenberg,JenniferJackman, Curt NyquistJoel Paul, Regan Ralph, and Michael Sharf for their
helpful comments.
1. Charlotte Bunch, Feminist Visions of Human Rights in the Twenty-Tht Century, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE TENT-FIRST CENTURY A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 968 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul
Mahoney eds., 1993).
2. "Egypt's Islamic Group Warns U.N. Conference" was the N.Y. Times' headline on the
Sunday before the Conference began. See Michael Georgy, Egypt's Islamic Group Warns' U.N.
Conference, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 28, 1994, at 6.
The Islamic Group advises all foreigners taking part in the licentiousness conference
known as the population conference, which all sectors of the Egyptian people have
rejected.
The Islamic Group, as its [sic] starts a new round of operations, urges all foreigners
not to come to Egypt during the coming period for the sake of their own lives.
Id.
I was reading the Sunday paper, having my coffee when I saw that headline, most
unexpectedly vivid in the normally sedate N.Y. Times. Having never attended a "licentiousness
conference" before, I decide I had better head toward Cairo.
Attendance at the Population Conference was not seriously undermined by the threats. Over
20,000 people from around the world attended. There were no terrorist incidents.
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"I don't think you American feminists should be insisting on this
birth control. I don't understand why you want this. It is very bad for
women."
Stunned, my first instinct was to deliver the standard law professor's
lecture to a naive younger woman on the central importance of
reproductive control as the material precondition for the freedom of
women. I managed instead to bite my tongue and simply ask why.
"It is a terrible thing for women, this birth control. Why should the
government decide how many children a woman has? Like in China,
where the government limits the women to only one child. This is
very sad for those women. Birth control is very bad for women."
I never ceased to be amazed by the variety of ways it is possible for
two intelligent people who basically like each other to misunderstand.
Commitment to "cross cultural communications"3 between women
has the requisite high theory/politically correct chic, but there is
nothing quite like the actual experience of two women having a good
chat.
"To me, as an American, birth control means the contraceptive
medical devices used to prevent pregnancy." I was relieved to be able
to explain my meaning. "You know, birth control pills, condoms,
IUDs, diaphragms. But it is not for the government to decide. It is
for the woman to decide for herself, to control herself when to have
children, not to be controlled by the government."
She too was deeply relieved. "Ah, yes. We call this family planning.
It is very important to be able to decide the spacing between the
children." Smiling warmly at each other, sitting on the hard bench,
waiting for our credentials, we patted our hands together and shared
cool water and mints.
"In our Koran, we respect the family planning. The Prophet
Mohammed, Peace Be Unto Him, recognized the importance of
spacing the children. But I would like to ask you a question, if I
may?" She leaned forward, confidentially, and lowered her voice. She
seemed very young to me. "The Prophet Mohammed recommends
3. See Mai-an Clech an, Feeling Foreign in Feminism, 1994 SIGNS 865 (accounting Thai
student's encounters with American feminism). Lim discusses the patterns of cultural
dominance of white American feminism as involving four concepts: privilege, denial,
individualism, and magic. Id. at 872-81; see also Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-
Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 189 (1992). Gunning advocates three steps for Western feminists confronting "culturally
challenging practices" such as female genital mutilation. First, the Western feminist scouts out
the limitations on her understanding by her own subjectivities and needs. Id. at 194, 204.
Second, she acknowledges her status as an "heir" of colonial imperialism, and the meaning this
has for women in subjugated societies. Id. at 212. Third, she trains herself to listen, rather than
talk, to women living in these societies. Id. at 213.
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the importance of breast feeding, to space the births of the children."
Her voice became very hushed. "Will this work?"
I suppose I should have referred her to medical experts, to the
literature assessing the statistical efficacy of various methods of family
planning techniques. But I wanted to respond to her as one woman
to another, in the immediacy of this moment. So I showed her the
pictures of my children, my beloved daughter Erica, and my beloved
son Rafael, born thirteen months apart.
"Breast feeding is very good for the health of the baby." I spoke
with the authority of experienced motherhood. "It is a great joy for
the mother to have the power to feed her child, to give her child
comfort and strength flowing out of her own body. I have happy
memories of nursing my baby."
"But it is not a reliable method of family planning. See? My
children are spaced very close together, and we had serious health
problems. My son is healthy now, and strong. But he and I both
suffered. And we are lucky to have good food, good medical care in
Boston. Not all people are so lucky."
She nodded smiling wryly. "So I have heard." She sighed, then
straightened her shoulders. "Then we will explain that the women and
children need family planning with medical devices. I am sure that
we can explain this."
She bounded up from the bench, crackling with energy, and raced
off to obtain those elusive press credentials. Darting, tiny but
confident, through the seething mass of frustrated, aggressive, angry,
Western journalists, she spoke a few words in Arabic to the door
guard, and entered the inner sanctum of the credentials room. I
wondered how she would manage with her editor and whether the
authorities in her country would try to censor her.
I was left on the bench, wondering whether my own work as a
lawyer committed to women would help at all. The legal language
seemed to actually become a barrier between us, rather than a
language of women's empowerment and connection. 4 We had
4. See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Post Colonial Feminism and the VeiL" Considering the Differences,
in FOR MARYJOE FRUG, 26 N. ENG. L. REv. 1527 (1992).
In a way, their [Arab Muslim women's] bodies seemed to be a battlefield where the
cultural struggles of post-colonial societies were waged. On the one hand, the western
attire which covered their bodies carried with it the "capitalist" construction of the
female body: one that is sexualized, objectified, thingified, and so on. However,
because capitalism never really won the day in post-colonial societies... these women's
bodies were also simultaneously constructed "traditionally"; "chattelized," "propertized,"
and terrorized as trustees of family (sexual) honor.
Id. at 1528; see also REGAN E. RALPH, WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT OF HUMAN RIGHiTS WATCH, A
MATrER OF PowER: STATE CONTROL OF WOMEN'S VIRGINrIY IN TURKEY (Dorothy Q. Thomas ed.,
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worked it through together, but I had the sense that it was a near
miss. Next time we might not be so lucky.
The language we use to describe our meanings can seem so simple
and straightforward-so precise and scientific. The "right to birth
control" embodies one of the clearest and least controversial aspects
of reproductive freedom for most people in American culture.'
The language of "rights" is given a material presence in my worlds
through law. "Rights" are physically embodied in court decisions or
statutes, treaties, or conventions. They are made real through the
languages of law, politics, and diplomacy, collectively, if ambivalently,
believed.6 In international law, collective belief of agreed upon rights
is often manifested through U.N. conferences, which provide
opportunities to discuss, debate, and clarify our meanings.
These conferences operate in some ways similar to the much
venerated but little practiced ancestor of democracy, the American
town meeting. With collective belief lying at the essence of rights, a
critical goal is broad consensus. One way the U.N. conference
mechanism could be understood is as a global performance of
collective belief.
The Cairo population conference presented an historic opportunity
to solidify a new consensus regarding issues of population, economic
1994).
5. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice O'Connor, speaking on behalf of the Court,
reaffirmed the constitutional right to use birth control as developed in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-05 (1992). The Court
in Casey stated:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage is
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most
States in the 19th Century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an
aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of
the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) ... Similar
examples may be found in ... Griswold v. Connecticut ....
Id. at 2805.
6. See PATRICIA WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163 (1991).
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true. Yet it is also true that blacks
believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them life where there was none
before; we held onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs, mothered them and
not the notion of them. And this was not the dry process of reification, from which
life is drained and reality fades as the cement of conceptual determinism hardens
round-but its opposite. This was the resurrection of life from ashes four hundred
years old. The making of something out of nothing took immense alchemical
fire-the fusion of a whole nation and the kindling of several generations. The illusion
became real for only a few of us; it is still elusive for most. But if it took this long to
breathe life into a form whose shape had already been forged by society, and which is
therefore idealistically if not ideologically accessible, imagine how long the struggle
would be without even that sense of definition, without the power of that familiar
vision.
1056
WAITING FOR CREDENTIALS
development, the environment, and the roles of women. The new
politics were made possible in part by the erosion of the old Cold War
"blocks," which had aligned into relatively fixed positions based on
the underlying economic forms of each government. Bringing down
the Communist/capitalist/non-aligned nation walls opened up global
politics, disclosing new spaces and new political playing fields.
The new Cairo consensus weaves together four previously separated
strands of international discourses: population stabilization policies,
sustainable economic development, environmental impact/consump-
tion concerns, and the education, economic status, and empowerment
of women. Each grouping represents major global political move-
ments.' Cairo, as the third in the U.N. series of population confer-
ences, represented a landmark shift in the understanding of these
policies. For the first time, population, poverty, the environment, and
women are understood in the U.N. context as interrelated and
interdependent.
In the first U.N. World Population Conference, held in Bucharest
in 1974, the language used to describe the issues focused on the
"population bomb," and the need to "control" the "exploding"
population. The urgency of the militarist images were enhanced by
the strong statements of impending population cataclysm facing us.
The "developed" nations (United States, Canada, Western Europe,
Japan, and others) urged the "under-developed" nations (most of the
rest of the world) to "control" their births. The non-aligned nations
(led by India), resisted the narrow focus on fertility rates, suggesting
that economic "development was the best contraceptive."8
By 1984, when the second U.N. Conference on Population was held
in Mexico City, the positions had shifted 180 degrees. The U.S.
delegation, under President Ronald Reagan's administration,
announced that population was a "neutral" factor, following an
approach that advocated allowing the free market of each family's
economy to determine the number and spacing of children.' The
"developing" or "Third World" countries, on the other hand, urgently
sought assistance from the "over-developed," "First World" nations to
7. See ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. bibijo., 1 1.5. "The 1994 Conference was
explicitly given a broader mandate [on development issues] than previous population
conferences, reflecting the growing awareness of the interlinkages among population issues,
sustained economic growth and sustainable development" Id.
8. U.S. Dep't of State, The United States and the International Conference on Population
and Development 1 (June 1994) [hereinafter U.S. Conference Statement].
9. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 670 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (citing U.S. Policy Statement at U.N. International Conference on Population (2d Sess.),
at 4-5).
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help in the implementation of population control policies. U.S.
funding for international family planning was nevertheless significant-
ly reduced."
The 1994 Cairo conference marks an historic shift. Even the title
of the conference reflects a new approach; "International Conference
on Population and Development" explicitly includes the issues of
sustainable economic development as a significant aspect of the
population topic."
Population, in the new consensus, is viewed as a complex, multifac-
eted issue. Emphasis is now placed on the context in which decisions
about childbearing are made. For the first time in a U.N. conference
on population, the role of women is seen as significant for examining
childbearing and fertility rates. No longer are women seen as
"contraceptive users" or "nonusers." Women are featured as human
beings with educational, economic, and power needs. 2
Despite this broader, more flexible, and realistic understanding, the
Cairo conference did not recognize a fundamental right to reproduc-
tive freedom. "While the International Conference on Population
and Development does not create any new international human
rights, it affirms the application of universally recognized human
rights standards to all aspects of population programmes."" The
question of a fundamental right to reproductive freedom is thus left
open, perhaps for further development at the 1995 U.N. Fourth
World Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing, China. Another
possibility is that formal declaration of such a new right is unnecessary
because the core meaning of reproductive freedom can be implied
from already existing international human rights.
Including reproductive freedom as an internationally recognized
human right is deeply contested. Some are opposed to the very
10. See DKr Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
11. U.S. Conference Statement, supra note 8, at 2.
12. Principle 4 of the ICPD Programme of Action provides:
Advancing gender equality and equity and the empowerment of women, and the
elimination of all kinds of violence against women, and ensuring women's ability to
control their own fertility, are cornerstones of population and development-related
programmes. The human rights of women and the girl-child are an inalienable,
integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participa-
tion of women in civil, cultural, economic, political, and social life, at the national,
regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on
grounds of sex, are priority objectives of the international community.
ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio., at princ. 4.
In addition, Chapter rV of the ICPD Programme of Action focuses on "Gender Equality,
Equity and Empowerment of Women." Id. 4.1-4.29.
13. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio., 1 1.15.
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notion of reproductive freedom based on religious or cultural
grounds. Others contest only some portion of the idea, such as
abortion, state-sponsored virginity examinations, child marriage, or
female genital mutilation, while subscribing to other portions of
reproductive self-determination. Yet others view the freedom to
determine reproductive decisions as belonging to the male head of
the family or group, not to the individual woman whose body is
involved.
The problem of defining the substantive content encompassed in
the idea of "reproductive freedom" is very difficult. It is addressed in
depth in other papers presented in this symposium. Professor
Rebecca Cook, in particular, has produced extensive substantive
analyses of the legal frameworks throughout the world that allow such
a specific right to be developed. In this Paper, I will address the
question from a different perspective. Instead of focusing on the
most difficult or contested substantive concepts included within
reproductive freedom, I will focus on what I think is probably among
the least controversial aspects of reproductive freedom, access to
information about medical facilities-rights to speech and travel.
My project in this Paper is to examine how we could visualize or
imagine providing remedies for and enforcing the concept of
international human rights extended to family planning information.
First, by the way of background, I will briefly sketch traditional
international human rights debates about the creation of and
remedies for a new category of human rights. In the second part of
the Paper, I will outline some of the feminist approaches to enforcing
human rights. My hope is that this will provide a starting point for
ongoing discussions about implementing a broader concept of an
international human right to reproductive freedom.
Traditional discussions about the enforcement of human rights
often begin with recognition of the discrepancy between the
statements of rights on paper and the reality of widespread abuses.'4
The debate develops in a two-stage process. First, traditional human
rights leaders debate whether a particular issue constitutes a recogniz-
able human right at all. Second, the problem of remedies for
violations of human rights is analyzed. In our specific case, the
14. See, e.g., Jan Martenson, The United Nations and Human Rights Today and Tomorow, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 925. The "gap" between rights
and remedies plays a central role in human rights theory, both in the traditional discussions and
in the feminist theories. The traditional discussion is summarized below in the text
accompanying notes 25-29. The feminist discussions are summarized in the text accompanying
notes 45-48.
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question is whether there should be a "new" international human
right to reproductive freedom, and if so, what remedies could be
developed.
An international human right to reproductive freedom could be
found using traditional human rights analysis, drawing upon existing
international treaties and charters."5 There are three basic principles
of international law from which support for such an international
right could be drawn: privacy, equality, and health. Each principle
has a distinguished pedigree. Although none of these principles are
self-executing law without further action at the national level, each
one carries some weight.16
Privacy has been recognized as a fundamental human right since at
least 1948 when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated
that "no one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his [sic]
privacy, family, home or correspondence." 7 Equality policies can be
found at the very origins of modem human rights in 1945 under the
U.N. Charter's commitment to "promoting and encouraging human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
15. See generally Berta E. Hermindez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an
InternationalHuman Right, 17BRooK.J. INT'LL. 309 (1991); Stephen L. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights
1983: An International Survey, 14 COLUM. HUM. Rfs. L. REv. 311 (1982-83).
16. This problem is sometimes referred to as the "soft law" debate. See generally ANTHONy
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAw ANTHOLOGY (1994). Human rights, in particular, can be viewed
as "soft."
What we are observing in the international human rights field is certainly not the
emergence of a general, extensive, uniform consistent, settled practice accompanied
by the more or less gradual building up of an opinionjuris. Rather, we have been
witnessing the steady emergence and broadening through decades of international
debate, innumerable expressions of international concern and an impressive number
of soft law resolutions, declarations, and the like, of a strong international consensus on
certain basic human rights obligations and standards.
Corresponding to these international developments, human rights law has flowered
quite impressively in many domestic legal orders.... Is it in our context irrelevant
that the history of international human rights law also has been a history' of
widespread, persistent violations of these rights, only too often committed by the very
states that speak out in their favor? Against this reality, to confirm the existence of
universal customary law is an exercise calling for optimistic emphasis on words and
much less attention to deeds.
Id. at 154 (citing Bruno Simma, A Hard Look at Soft Law: Remarks, 82 PROC. AM. Soc' INT'L L.
372, 378 (1988)).
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doc. bibilo., art. 12.
The European Convention on Human Rights also recognized, as early as 1950, a fundamental
right of privacy. "Everyone has the right to respect for his [sic] private and family life, his [sic]
home and his [sic] correspondence." European Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 8(1).
Regulation of abortion is an intervention in private life under the European Convention
according to the decision of the European Commission on Human Rights in the landmark case,
Bruggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 10 Eur. Comm'n.
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 100, 115 (1978). The central question in Bruggemann was whether such
intervention in private life was justified as protecting the fetus' right to life. Id.
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. .. sex." 8 Health, like privacy, was recognized as fundamental in
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided that
"[e]veryone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well being of himself [sic] and his [sic] family .. .including
medical care." 9 All three have been expanded and reaffirmed in
subsequent treaties, charters, and conventions.
A right to reproductive freedom could draw upon any of these
three principles, alone or in combination. Yet, even those deeply
committed to enforcing international human rights raise concerns
about "watering down" human rights with "social" issues. In this view,
it is important to avoid
[c] onfusion over the very notion of human rights caused by gliding
too easily over the differences between civil and social rights. Civil
rights require from the State essentially-but not exclusively-an
abstention. Consequently, they must be observed immediately,
totally and universally. On the contrary, social rights require an
active intervention from the State. As a result, they may be
implemented progressively, partially and selectively."0
The narrower conception of human rights is generally not based on
either opposition to the substantive concept of reproductive freedom
or hostility to women. Most often, the narrower concept is explained
in terms of the scarcity of human rights enforcement resources and
the fragility of the current human rights system.21 Other commenta-
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3). The preamble to the United Nations Charter also "reaffirm[s]
... the equal rights of men and women." I& pmbl.
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doc. bibio., art. 25(1).
20. M. Bossuyt, International Human Rights Systems: Strengths and Weaknesses, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRS CENTURY, supra note 1, at 47. Professor Bossuyt is former Chair
(1989) of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Professor Bossuyt has gone on to observe
that "[tihis is also the reason why the control of the observance of civil rights can be entrusted
to judicial bodies, while the control of the implementation of social rights is left to administra-
tive or political bodies." Id. at 52. He concluded that "[a] careless utilization of the terms
'rights' and 'human rights' weakens the whole concept of human rights." Id. at 54.
21. See, e.g., Aryeh Neier, Remedial Human Rights Strategies, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 951. In a speech addressing a conference in which a broad
range of possible new human rights were addressed, Mr. Neier cautioned against overloading
the current human rights framework.
The difficulty I have with those calls [to broaden the framework of human rights],
some of which I sympathize with individually, though not all of them, is that most
existing institutions that try to protect human rights lack the capacity to do more than
they are presently doing. They cannot cope with a larger number of issues than at
present.
I think the framework of human rights could collapse quite readily if it were
broadened to the degree that has been suggested. The framework of human rights is
so broad at this stage that the various institutions that operate in the field are not
capable of dealing with those matters which fall within the present framework as
human rights is most narrowly defined.
Id. at 951-52.
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tors resist attempts to guarantee some human rights for women in the
private sphere because of possible conflicts with other human rights
such as privacy, cultural, associational, and religious rights.22
Within the traditional human rights discourse there are also
advocates of a broader and more inclusive approach. This perspective
views human rights as indivisible. "What is meant by universality is
inclusiveness of human rights as opposed to exclusiveness, respect for
cultural diversity without falling into cultural relativism, regional
efforts supporting the world-wide effort in favor of human rights. 23
Those advocating an expansion of human rights to include economic
and social rights often stress the importance of those rights in positive
law.24
Regardless of whether the current human rights approach tilts
toward a narrow definition of civil rights, or a broader conception of
indivisible human rights, at least some portion of the notion of
reproductive freedom could be included. For example, the most
traditional views of civil rights include the right to speak and receive
information, even though others may find that speech offensive or
upsetting. The question then becomes whether a human right to
speak about family planning could be enforced.
Much attention is traditionally given to the question of enforceabili-
ty in international law. Indeed, some commentators question whether
international law is in fact law at all, or merely "positive morality" in
the absence of a police force.' The response to this, not surprising-
ly, is for some to advocate increasing the international criminal justice
processes, to make international law enforceable in modes similar to
or through national or local law. Others perceive enforceability at the
international level as a system of guidance for decisionmakers,
indicating presumptive weights to be given to various factors, but
22. SeeTHEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITIQUE
OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 77-79 (1986). Professor Karen Engle has analyzed this position
in depth. See Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13
MICH.J. INT'L L. 517, 524-31 (1992).
23. Peter Leuprecht, Conflict Prevention and Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution: Looking
Towards the Twenty-First Century, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1,
at 959, 963.
Mr. Leuprecht, as Director of Human Right Council of Europe, has further observed that
"[W hat is being advocated here is the broad concept of human rights already recognized by
standards of international law." Id. at 964.
24. See. e.g., Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS, Q. 156, 184-86
(1987).
25. JOHN AUSTEN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENE DETERMINED; THE USES OF THE STUDY
OFJURISPRUDENCE 127 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954), quoted in Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law
Really "Law"?, 79 NW. U. L. REv. 1293, 1294 n.3 (1984/1985).
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conceptualizing international law as essentially a process of policy
communications.26 Between the polar extremes of guns and politics,
a third enforceability theory focuses on the importance of reciprocity,
emphasizing "compliance" with international norms." The reciproc-
ity analysis itself raises questions about the proportionality of the
response to a given noncompliance. 28
The questions of enforceability in traditional international law
analysis could also be examined with some attention to the differences
between enforcement and remedies.29 Questions of enforcement
raise the problems of positive law, the lack of an executive branch,
and the lack of a military or police force. To some extent these
questions are distinct from the problems of creating specific remedies
to address violations of international law, including international
human rights.
The traditional human rights discussions regarding the availability
of specific remedies can only be partially sketched in the confines of
this Paper. The official U.N. Human Rights Commission processes
include studies by the Commission or the General Assembly, as well
as hearing petitions claiming patterns of human rights abuses."°
Some commentators focus on prevention of human rights abuses,
either thr6ugh economic development,31 or through analogy to the
26. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 887 n.109 (1960),
critiqued in D'Amato, supra note 25, at 1302 n.14.
27. ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-22 (1981).
Professor Fisher challenges the notion that the primary enforcement technique for international
rules should be comparable to those of the criminal law-deterrence and the punishment of
violations. Id. at 16. He suggests instead that law is best understood as a way of structuring
political forces. Id.
Enhancing compliance for international rules through reciprocity is, in Professor Fisher's
analysis, a multifaceted process. Self interest, reputation, concern with consequential action by
other countries, fear of reciprocal noncompliance, as well as fear of adverse military reaction,
are some of the significant factors. Id. at 127-40.
28. SeeEUSABETHZOLLER, PEACETIMEUNILATERALREMEDIES: ANANALySISOFCOUNTERMEA-
SURES 24-27 (1984).
29. I am indebted to Joel Paul for this point.
30. Jan Martenson, The United Nations and Human Rights Today and Tomorrow, in HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR THE TVENY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 925, 928-31.
31. SeePhilip Alston, International Commission of'Jurists, Prevention Versus Cure as a Human
Rights Strategy, Developmen; Human Rights and the Rule of Law (1981) (report of conference held
in The Hague), cited in Theo Van Boven, Prevention of Human Rights Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE TWENT-FIRS CENTURY, supra note 1, at 937, 940 n.5.
ProfessorVan Boven critiques the structuralist approach on three grounds. First, it is stronger
in analysis than in implementation. Second, the structuralist emphasis on international relations
and the international economic order did not pay sufficient attention to patterns of injustice at
the domestic level. Third, the structuralists ignored the fact that persistent violations of human
rights also result from religious, national, and ethnic divisions between people. Id. at 941. I
would suggest he also add gender to this list.
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U.N. "peace-keeping" functions.8 2  Court enforcements at the
international, regional, 8 and national levels can play a significant
role in making human rights enforceable for both non-state34 as well
as state actions.
Nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, are
influential in what Aryeh Neier has termed the truth-telling and
justice phases of human rights enforcement." Nongovernmental
organizations also play a crucial role in training women as political
and diplomatic leaders, and in providing links between the (often
32. B.G. Ramcharan, From Peace-Keeping Forces to Humanitarian Forces? A Comparison of the
United Nations Peace-Keeping and Human Rights Activities, in HUMANITAIANLAW (R.C. Hingorani
ed., 1987), cited in Van Boven, supra note 31, at 943 n.18.
33. The case of Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1992), presents an example of international human rights developed at the regional level. The
European Court of Human Rights extended the guarantees of free speech to pregnancy
counselling services that provided the telephone numbers of medical clinics in Great Britain
where a full range of reproductive services, including abortion, are provided. Id. at 27; see infra
text accompanying notes 41 & 56 (discussing Open Door &Dublin Well Woman case).
34. See generally Claudio Grossman, Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim
Representation in Human Rights Litigation, 15 HASNNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 363 (1992).
Professor Grossman was one of the attorneys representing the victims in the landmark Velasquez
Rodriguez Case in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-
Am C.H.R. 127, OAS/ser. L/V./I.19, doc. 13 (1988), reirinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989).
Professor Van Boven focuses on the landmark use of a regional human rights court to extend
state liability for human rights violations by nonstate actors in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose the
appropriate punishment and ensure the victim adequate compensation.
Van Boven, supra note 31, at 945 & n.21 (citing Velasquez Rodriguez Case).
An illegal act that violates human rights and is initially not directly imputable to a
State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person
responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the
violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.
Velasquez Rodigue, 1 172, cited in Van Boven, supra note 31, at 946 & n.25.
The potential importance of regional human rights court enforcement as an effective
technique can also be highlighted by examining the role of the European Court of Human
Rights in the Irish abortion/speech case, Open Door Counselling, discussed in depth below in the
text accompanying notes 41, 56.
35. Neier, supra note 21, at 952-53.
The most important thing that a civilian, democratic government should try to do as
a remedial strategy in the wake of a catastrophe is to provide some form of accountabil-
ity. This accountability may be divided into at least two phases. One phase is the truth
phase. In this phase, the level of victimization is made known. The identities of the
victims are made known. The character of the abuses that they endured are made
known. The identity of the victimizers is made known. This is the truth phase.
The other phase is the justice phase. In the justice phase one tries to see to it that
at least those who have committed the most egregious abuses are punished for their
abuses.
Unfortunately, the record thus far in achieving accountability, either in the truth
phase or in the justice phase, is extremely poor world wide ... [T]he principle
reason is the fragility of civilian democratic governments.
1064
WAITING FOR CREDENTIALS
female) field agencies implementing the policies and their (often
male) governments.
One could spend considerable energy debating which of the tfiree
principles (privacy, equality, or health) is "best" for women, examin-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of each. One could add to the basic
trilogy by searching international documents for additional power
sources, arguing that some fourth, fifth, or sixth international human
right would be a more direct or saleable route to reproductive
freedom.3 6
This conversation could reach a cooperative, inclusive, and
harmonious conclusion 7 by agreeing on a synergistic approach in
which all three principles (plus any other good ones we find) are used
together to advance the empowerment of women with respect to
reproductive freedom. Strategic decisions about which of the three
policies to emphasize in a given political context would be understood
as exactly that-strategic-with full recognition that in a different
political context a different strategy might be more efficacious.
My own questions are a bit different. I am troubled by the
discrepancy between the longstanding agreement in international
human rights documents about privacy, equality, and health for
women, and the widespread and serious abuse of women with respect
to reproduction. 8 Even the simplest human right framed in the
most traditional and reassuring terms, the right to free speech about
medical information, 9 continues to be deeply contested when the
topic is reproduction and women.'
36. Slavery and indentured servitude are my personal favorites for additional rights-based
discourses. For the U.S. domestic law version of this concept, see Reva Siegal, Reasoningfrom the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261 (1992).
Since its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court has employed the Equal
Protection Clause to analyze class- or caste-based regulation of women's conduct. From
a historical perspective it is clear that abortion-restrictive regulation is caste legislation,
a traditional mode of regulating women's conduct, concerned with compelling them
to perform work that has traditionally defined their subordinate social role and status.
Id. at 351.
37. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WoMEN's DEvELOPMENT (1982).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 44-48 (providing discussion of what Professor Engle
calls the "gap" between law and the reality of women's lives).
39. The language, itself, in which scientific or medical information is described raises
complex problems. For an excitirig and insightful analysis of the gendered nature of medical
language, see EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REPRODUC-
TION (1987). Professor Martin examines the deeply gendered nature of the language used in
standard medical textbooks. See id. at 27-67.
40. See Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct H. R. (ser. A) at 22-27
(1992).
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Why does my well-educated, young, Arabic friend lack basic
information about breast feeding as an unreliable method of family
planning? Why, for that matter, are my own adolescent children in
a liberal Boston suburb denied education about their bodies,
sexuality, and birth control? Why does Ireland fight so desperately to
censor the publication of telephone numbers of British medical
facilities? 4
1
I am troubled by suspicions that we expend our precious feminist
energies fighting about language in seasonal cycles of international
conference documents, furious sounds eventually signifying nothing.
Are the promises of real human rights for women merely the
sophisticated, educated, modem version of the myths of chivalry, in
which an abused woman is rescued by the human rights knights in
shining armor?' Is the female role to sit like Penelope waiting for
Odysseus, besieged by aggressive suitors anxious to possess her body
and lands? Patient Penelope, spinning her rights by day, only to be
unravelled by night, until her human-rights-questing hero returns to
bring justice to her?
Sinking deeper into my cynical mode, I ask whether this is the latest
trap to contain women's powers, safely channelling them into endless
legal/diplomatic dispute loops. By emphasizing the legal framework,
are we diverting women from other paths that may be more challeng-
ing to current holders of power? Perhaps we should be exploring
other options to assist women in terms of economic, military, and
political power. I
Yet framing the issues in terms of human rights can also be a
source of power for women, a language in which we reconceive
ourselves beyond the limits of our particular cultural or historical
moment. Thinking in terms of human rights helps stretch our self-
concepts, helps us move beyond the old stories which limited our
imaginations about possible roles for women. The rhetoric of human
rights provides one way for us to break the old bad habits of thinking
of ourselves primarily as victims-powerless, at the mercy of brutal
men.
Conceptualizing women in terms of human rights can become self-
empowering. It can serve as one way for women to envision male
41. See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Abortion, Speech and the European Community, 1992 J. Soc.
WELFARE & FAM. L 17 (1992); see also David Cole, Going to England: Irish Abortion Law and the
European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COM. L. REv. 113 (1993).
42. For a charming, erudite, and always amusing account of the human rights activist as
knight, with careful attention to the gendered nature of this work, see David Kennedy, Spring
Break, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (1985) (accounting experiences in human right, mission in
Uruguay).
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authority as less than unified, less than univocal, less than universal.
There are fissures in the patriarchy. Naming ourselves as rights-
bearers, and fully human, helps us invent languages to imagine and
claim our patrimony.' Can we imagine ways to actually enforce an
international human right to reproductive freedom?
Would we have U.N. peacekeeping forces delivering condoms and
requiring the local men to actually wear them? Could we have teams
of international experts from powerful official institutions sent as
observers to "watch" reproductive practices in medical offices to
ensure that women's rights were not abused by doctors implementing
coercive state policies?
Could we imagine international justice extending to criminal trials
of those who use systematic rape, involuntary impregnation, or
coerced childbirth as a tactic of war? What if it is a tactic of national-
ism, for example, to increase the population, as in the former
Communist regime in Romania? What if it is a tactic of religious
propagation, a strategy to increase the membership of a given
religion?
One of the classic errors of those not familiar with contemporary
feminist theory is to attempt to find "the" feminist position, as if forty
years of multidisciplinary, multicultural, theoretical development
could be reduced to one easy lesson. There are many possible
feminist approaches to any issue, and the question of an international
human right to reproductive freedom is no exception. A full analysis
of the variety and complexity of feminist approaches to human rights
analysis would require more development than this Paper permits.'
Professor Karen Engle has undertaken an in-depth review of
feminist legal literature in international human rights. She classifies
a variety of feminist approaches as doctrinalists, institutionalists, and
external critics.
Doctrinalists generally describe a specific problem facing women in
some or all parts of the world and then show doctrinally how the
problem constitutes an international human rights violation.
Institutionalists critically examine international legal institutions
43. For a concrete example of thinking and acting as rights-bearers, see the Irish abortion
stories infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
44. For a succinct, intelligent, and accessible introduction to the variety of feminist
approaches to legal problems, see Judith G. Greenberg, Introduction, in MARY JOE FRUG,
POSMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM ix, ix-xxxi (1992). The classic overview analyzing the relationships
between a variety of feminist thought and international human rights remains Professor Karen
Engle's article, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet. See generally Karen
Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517
(1992).
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that are created to enforce human rights. They study both
mainstream human rights institutions and specialized women's
institutions.'
[T]he first two assume and act upon the belief that women's rights
have and can be assimilated to the human rights structure. The
third approach [external critiques], on the other hand, questions
whether assimilation to the structure as it exists is possible ...
[and] tend[s] to believe that the structure itself will have to change
in order to accommodate women's rights.46
Professor Engle's emphasis on the gap between the various
international human rights documents and the lack of progress in
improving the lives of women is, I believe, a landmark insight into
public international law analysis generally. Focusing on the gap helps
explain the different approaches between those who focus on
documents, treaties, conventions, and the like (doctrinalists), and
those who focus on the processes of international and regional
institutions (institutionalists). Doctrinalists tend to work their way
through the legal documents, then conclude with a chapter or section
addressing the problems of enforcement.4 7 Institutionalists begin at
the enforcement gap. "Institutionalists all begin by addressing the
same gap between existing law and the reality of women's lives that
the doctrinalists eventually confront. Thus, their works start at the
same point at which doctrinalists turn to strategies for implementa-
tion.""
45. Engle, supra note 44, at 522.
46. Engle, supra note 44, at 523.
47. In Engle's view, doctrinalists
identify a gap between the existence of positive law and the reality of women's lives.
Most of the advocates respond to this gap by first showing that the law they cite is
authoritative-that it is legally or moralIy binding-and then working out strategies for
implementing the law.
Engle, supra note 44, at 540.
[Q]uestions often arise about implementation and enforceability. The surfacing of
these questions is usually tied to a concern about cultural differences and disagree-
ments, and their impact on the law's effectiveness. Thus, the works often drift into a
more strategic mode either when the advocates cannot claim absolute legal or moral
authority, or when they acknowledge that authority alone will not make women's rights
a reality.
Id. at 543.
The strategic approaches, then, seem to emerge out of a basic lack of faith in the
ability of positive law, on its own, to achieve change. This lack of faith initially
manifests itself in questions about the enforceability of international law. While
doctrinalists do not generally assume bad faith on the part of those entities that
monitor and enforce human rights law, they nevertheless recognize difficulties with
enforcing "universal" human rights.
Id. at 544.
48. Engle, supra note 44, at 555.
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My own approach in this Paper also focuses on this gap between law
and reality. Rather than review the legal literature, however, which
Professor Engle has already ably undertaken, or analyze substantive
human rights doctrines or institutions, I have taken a different
approach. I have tried to look at a particular story about reproductive
freedom, the story of Ireland's recent struggles with censoring speech
and restricting travel. Ireland refused to allow publication of the
telephone numbers of British medical clinics, and attempted to
prevent travel to Britain to obtain reproductive medical services,
including abortion. These efforts to restrict reproductive freedom
were abolished through a variety of international and domestic court
decisions and a public referendum in Ireland.
In examining the Irish story, I will not follow the traditional human
rights technique of separating the discussion into two distinct
phases-substantive rights and remedies. I think it is more helpful to
examine the interrelationships between rights and remedies, to view
them as in a dynamic rather than a static relationship. I also differ
from many feminist analysts in that my focus is not primarily on
whether women's rights such as abortion-related speech and travel
should be integrated into existing human rights frameworks,49 or
whether it is to our advantage to strengthen separate, specifically
women-oriented institutions and remedies." Instead, I am trying to
49. Feminist approaches to enforcement can also follow a variety of strategies, which are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. One path could be to seek inclusion of reproductive freedom
issues through integration into already existing human rights legal frameworks. Defining
systematic rape as a potential war crime, for example, or extending the right of free speech to
include the telephone numbers of British medical clinics providing legal abortion services, would.
be to extend currently existing human rights law enforcement to include issues of reproduction
that are important to women.
A second approach could be to encourage health organizations, such as the World Health
Organization, medical associations, medical schools, and other similar institutions, to recognize
and advocate a fundamental right to health that includes reproduction.
Integrationist approaches, whether by focusing on extending human rights to health, or
extending health to human rights, present an attractive enforcement strategy because of the
potential legitimacy derived from "hooking" powerful human rights languages together with
medical expert/technology discourses. The combined powers of legal and medical enforcement
appear very attractive.
It could be anticipated that the integrationist strategies will encounter some difficulties,
particularly in light of the tensions between medical and legal professions, even before we reach
the difficult questions of gender. The caring professions are often hard pressed for adequate
resources to perform their work, and some policymakers may define the gender issues as
peripheral to the central role of the particular profession.
50. Feminist approaches to enforcement of an international human right to reproductive
freedom could also, perhaps simultaneously, explore more separatist enforcement strategies.
The international legal mechanisms for enforcement would include the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention).
Enforcement theory would focus on pressuring the United Nations and local governments to
strengthen the Women's Convention through allocating resources to the Commission on the
Status of Women or the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
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articulate what I call a "transformative" notion of human rights by
looking at a concrete, localized story of the struggle for reproductive
freedom.51
My concept of transformative human rights is not fixed, nor is it a
complete model that would apply universally to all situations. I do
not really seek to define, confine, or contain the meaning of this
phrase. Instead I would like to explore a notion of transformative
human rights by articulating four factors, or threads, which seem to
signal that major shifts in power relations are afoot. These signs of
transformation are not always present, nor do I mean to imply a
linear causal relationship between the factors and the potential for
paradigmatic shifts in power relations. My project is more modest, an
attempt to articulate these four threads and then follow them through
one story of reproductive freedom in Ireland. The four factors to
highlight are sources, targets, spaces, and moves.
When the media disclosed the refusal of the Irish government to
allow the parents of a fourteen-year-old pregnant rape victim to take
her to England for an abortion, the streets of Dublin spontaneously
erupted with demonstrators. This case, known as the X case,52
transformed the Irish legal and political discourse about abortion, in
part through traditional human rights languages about the "right to
(CEDAW) equal to those given to the U.N. Commission on (general) Human Rights, or perhaps
in proportion to the world's male/female population statistics. Procedural enforcement
mechanisms could also be made more formally equal to the men's human rights enforcement
mechanisms through extending the time of meetings under CEDAW or extendingjurisdiction
to include individual, group, and nongovernmental organization petitions.
In the United Nations the Human Rights Commission has more power to hear and
investigate cases than the Commission on the Status of Women, more staffand budget,
and better mechanisms for implementing its findings. Thus it makes a difference in
what can be done if a case is deemed a violation of women's rights and not of human
rights.
Bunch, supra note 1, at 972.
A separate-but-equal strategy for enforcement has obvious pitfalls, most notably those of
marginalization, political isolation, and vulnerability to economic cutbacks and political attacks.
Despite these clear drawbacks, calls for equality have a certain political and moral power. If
argued in combination with the integrationist strategy, the fundamental unfairness could be
highlighted. Refusing either to permit women to integrate reproductive freedom into existing
human rights/health frameworks or to permit women to develop separate but equally funded
and powerful institutions leaves half the population with few viable options in reproductive
matters that directly affect their bodies and identities.
51. This technique might be classified as "postmodern feminist," for those who need such
signposts to help in their explorations of contemporary feminist theory. I am mostly content
to be labeled in this way, although other postmodern feminists may be more ambivalent. I
follow here, I hope, in the footsteps of my late colleague, MaryJoe Frug. See FRUG, supra note
44. I'm also deeply influenced byJUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990).
52. Attorney Gen. v. X, [1992] I.LR.M. 401 (Ir. H. Ct), re'd, (1992] I.L.R.M. 414 (Ir. S.C.),
reprinted in THE ATrORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS: JUDGMENTS OF THE HIGH COURT AND
SUPREME COURT wiiT SUBMISSIONS MADE BY COUNSEL TO THE SUPREME COURT (Sunniva
McDonagh ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE ATrORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS].
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travel" within Europe and the "right to information" about medical
services. But the transformation also occurred in the discourses
among people. Ordinary citizens in Ireland broke their silence on
the question of "going to England.""3
The X case arose as the centerpiece in a trilogy of Irish abortion-
related decisions. In the first case, Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan,54 the European Court of Justice had
indicated a year before the Xcase (somewhat obliquely) that Europe's
open trade borders protect the free flow of information about
medical services, including abortion clinics, but declined to directly
confront Irish censorship of British telephone numbers." In the
second case in the Irish trilogy, the X Case, the Irish Supreme Court
held that the provisions of the Irish Constitution that prohibit
abortion contain an exception in cases which threaten the life of the
pregnant woman, including the threat of suicide.56 The third case,
53. Cole, supra note 41, at 119-20 n.27 ("The practice [of Irish women going to England
to have legal abortions] is so well established that the phrase 'going to England' has become a
euphemism in Irish parlance for having an abortion." (citing Interview with Ruth Riddick, Open
Door Counseling Service, Dublin, Ireland (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Weekend Ed., Mar. 20,
1993)).
Estimates vary regarding how many Irish women travel to England for abortions each year.
Most estimates are in -the range of 4000 to 6000 per year, but many women in fear give false
addresses when obtaining abortions. The French Family Planning movement estimates a high
of 15,000 Irish women per year. The Guttmacher Institute estimates a low of around 3000
women per year. Id. at 119 n.26.
54. 3 C.M.LR. 849 (E.CJ. 1991).
55. See Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan, 3 C.M.LR.
849, 890 (E.C.J. 1991); see also Spahn, supra note 41, at 21-23, 29-31. In Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Ltd. v. Grogan, 1 C.M.LR. 689, 700 (Ir. S.C. 1990), the
Supreme Court of Ireland upheld an injunction prohibiting the Irish Students' Union from
publishing the telephone numbers of medical clinics in Great Britain that provide legal abortion
services. The European Court ofJustice (ECJ) heard the case under Article 60 of the Treaty of
Rome, which purports to guarantee open borders within the European Community for the
provision of medical services. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. at 890.
ECJ avoided a direct confrontation with Ireland by creating a new standing doctrine as a
threshhold to invoke the provisions of Article 59. Although recognizing that abortion is a
"service" within the meaning of Article 60, the ECJ held that the Irish Student Union lacked
standing to challenge the censorship because they did not have an economic interest in the
British medical clinics. See id at 890-91; see also Spahn, supra note 41, at 21-23, 29-31.
56. Z, (1992] I.LR.M. at 427; see also THE ATrORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS, supra note
52. In the X case, the parents of a pregnant 14-year-old girl who had been raped by her best
friend's father informed Irish prosecutors of the rape prior to taking the child to England for
an abortion. X [1992] I.L.R.M. at 406. The prosecutors obtained an ex parte injunction, based
on the Irish Constitution's protection for unborn life, barring the girl from getting an abortion
in England. Id. After a full hearing, the Irish trial court ordered the girl to remain in Ireland
until the child was born. Id. at 414. The girl and her parents appealed the decision to the Irish
Supreme Court.
The Irish Supreme Court reversed the lower court within 10 days. X [1992] I.LR.M. at 427.
It did not address questions of travelling to England under European Community law, which
would be involved under the Grogan case. See id. at 430-32. Instead, the Court addressed the
question as if the abortion would be performed within Ireland. Id. at 432.
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which was decided about six months after the opinion in the X case,
was the decision of the European Court of Human Rights affirming
a right to free speech, which included the dissemination of British
medical clinics' telephone numbers. Political victory in the Irish
popular vote referendum on abortion information and the right to
travel to obtain abortions came a few weeks later.
Abortion is now legal on the soil of Ireland for the first time since
the mid-Victorian era," though only in cases that present a threat to
the life of the pregnant woman, including the threat of suicide.
Telephone numbers of British medical clinics should now be available
according to the law. The right to travel freely across the internal
borders of the European Community to obtain abortions is now
recognized in Irish law. This occurred in a nation which takes its
Roman Catholicism so seriously that the Irish Constitution itself
recognizes Catholicism as the official religion.59 In fact, in 1983,
Ireland adopted a constitutional amendment protecting the right to
life of the fetus.'
The Irish story provides a concrete context in which to explore the
four factors that I believe present some of the characteristics of
transformative notions of human rights. The first factor focuses on
the sources of human rights activity. A transformative approach
differs from a "trickle down" approach in which the source of human
rights flow from international human rights doctrine through officials
and institutions down to the oppressed masses of women. The Irish
story did not present a situation in which the European Court of
Human Rights forced Ireland to legalize abortion based upon
interpretation of the notions of privacy, equality, or health in the
European Convention on Human Rights. Transformative human
rights also differ from a "bottom up" theory, in which the local
customs or traditions are idealized or seen as immutable, unchange-
able by law, and differences among local women are used to justify
The girl, X, had been hospitalized for violent nausea and dehydration. X [1992] I.L.IM.
at 406. She had threatened to commit suicide if forced to carry on with the pregnancy. Id.
Expert testimony confirmed a serious possibility of suicide if she were forced into childbirth.
Id. at 407.
The Irish Supreme Court held that where there is a real and substantial threat to the life of
the pregnant woman, abortion could be justified. Id. at 427; see THE ATrORNEY GENERAL V. X
AND OTHERS, supra note 52, at 47-62.
57. Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H. IL (ser. A) at 27 (1992);
see also Cole, supra note 41.
58. Irish criminal law, following that of their British overlords, banned abortion in 1861.
SeeJAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 345 (1992).
59. Id. at 556-57.
60. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
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the status quo based on a divide and conquer maneuver. The
existence of some women in Ireland who oppose abortion, and the
widely shared and deeply rooted Irish beliefs in Roman Catholicism,
were not seen as an absolute defense to human rights for others in
Ireland who do not share or care to practice those religious and
customary beliefs.
The range of documentary sources was not limited in the Irish case
trilogy to "public" international law (i.e., the European Convention on
Human Rights). In the Irish cases, the local activists also claimed a
right under "private" trade law, that of the European Economic
Community.
The Treaty of Rome was the document from which the right to
British telephone numbers was first claimed. The Treaty established
the economic union of Europe, and the forum was the (much
surprised) European Court of Justice, which had thought its jurisdic-
tion was limited to trade issues and would not extend to (sticky,
political) human rights issues. Medical services, however, constitute
an aspect of trade protected under European Community laws.
The European Court of Justice did not immediately leap into the
breach by telling Ireland to stop censoring British medical clinics'
telephone numbers. Instead, the Court of Justice held that the right
to information about medical services within the European Communi-
ty was protected under Articles 59 and 60, but that the Irish student
union lacked economic standing. This left Ireland some time to
maneuver a graceful exit, without foreclosing future review by the
Court ofJustice. Thus, European regional economic law served as a
powerful, cautionary device, warning Ireland of the outside limits on
nationalism and local religious customs.
In the Irish story, examining the sources of human rights law is the
first key factor. The story illustrates a dynamic relationship between
international doctrine (public and private law) and local human rights
activists, in which the local activists frame the scope of the immediate
issue based on the range of potentials, or sources, presented in
international law. Perhaps the Irish activists were too cautious, and
should have sought outright legalization of abortion. Perhaps the
European Courts (of Human Rights and Justice) were too slow to
respond to the Irish complaints. Nevertheless, Irish law and culture
ultimately underwent a "sea of change" on the difficult issues of
abortion, free speech, and travel.
A transformative analysis focuses on a complex dynamic of
relationships between the international human rights communities
and the local human rights activists. The source of the rights involved
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in the Irish story included international human rights law, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights as well as the incorporation
of human rights provisions into the European Economic Community
as interpreted by the European Court of Justice. But the decision
regarding which portions of the universal right to reproductive
freedom are to be targeted at a particular historical moment is made
at the local level, by the activists themselves.
If the sources of transformative human rights law are the first key
factor, the second factor to watch is the target. In the Irish story, the
local activists did not target international human rights establishments
to push for statements in documents recognizing rights to abortion,
abortion-related speech, or travel. Nor did the Irish activists allow the
lack of support from established human rights organizations to deter
them. One key aspect of this transformation was the refusal to wait
for permission from some authority or gatekeeper to define what is
or is not a human/women's rights issue. The targets chosen were the
specific and concrete legal impediments to specific needs of Irish
women seeking medical services (the British telephone numbers, and
the ability to travel to Britain).
Targeting the issues is left to the strategic sense of local human
rights activists. This is a local, not global strategy. Some human
rights activists might believe that the right to chose legal abortion
itself should be recognized as a fundamental human right. I certainly
agree personally with a substantive position allowing individuals to
chose safe, legal abortion. But the decision of how to frame the issue
in Ireland is made in the concrete context of local political activity,
not at an abstract legal or academic level.
The third factor, the spaces, involves an interesting deployment of
overlapping remedies. Listed in chronological order, four legal spaces
were ultimately involved: the European Court of Justice, the Irish
Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and an Irish
public referendum. The Irish activists used both public and private
international law remedies, but were ultimately successful at the
unexpected level of municipal law through an Irish Supreme Court
case and a public referendum in Ireland. The X case, involving the
fourteen-year-old pregnant rape victim, was the centerpoint of this
story, with the European Court of Justice and European Court of
Human Rights cases as the bookends.
The Xcase itself was decided at the Irish Supreme Court level. The
global furor over the Xcase occurred just as the free speech case was
pending in the European Court of Human Rights. The European
Court of Human Rights case was decided favorably to the human
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rights activists just weeks before the popular referendum in Ireland.
In the referendum, the Irish voters affirmed the right to free speech,
including British abortion clinics' telephone numbers, as well as the
right to travel to Britain to obtain medical services for abortions.
I am not suggesting that any local activists had the brilliance to
orchestrate this remarkable series of fortuitous events. I have met
most of them, and while I think they are remarkably smart, flexible,
and resilient, I do not think any human being could organize all this.
There is clearly a large element of luck in this story. It is known as
the "luck of the Irish."
Yet to write this remarkable series of events off as merely "luck" is
to foreshorten our analysis of transformative human rights. This story
involves a series of moves, of strategic choices. These moves reflect
the abilities of local activists to draw from a variety of international
law sources, concretely target specific portions of reproductive rights,
maneuver through a variety of international and municipal spaces,
and respond to opportunities as they arise.
There are three "moves" which I think are representative of a range
of feminist techniques in this field. I have chosen to articulate the
variety within feminism as techniques, strategies, or moves, rather
than as fixed identities (doctrinalists/institutionalists/externalists) 6'1
because I believe that individual authors and players shift emphasis in
strategies both over time and in differing political situations. I also
believe that our larger feminist movements themselves change their
emphases as they mature and in response to shifting political climates.
Static categories of feminism, I think, are less useful than observing
the flow of power, seeing feminists as active players, initiating,
responding, and shifting in dynamics of transformation.'
These three moves, or strategies, I describe as challenging,
dissecting, and transforming. The first approach, challenging,
confronts sharply and directly the construction of "human" rights as
61. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Engle's landmark
article).
62. I am also concerned that fixing notions of feminist thought through labelling or
categorizing unwittingly assists lazy or hostile scholars unwilling to read, grapple with, and
respond fully to the vitality of feminist intellectual and political movements that have so deeply
shaped the latter half of the 20th century. This is the fear of reductionist, or cartoon, feminism.
While I still feel concern about fixed labels within feminism, I also vividly remember a
discussion in the Boston area fem/crits in which we read an early draft of a manuscript by my
late colleague MaryJoe Frug. The manuscript involved re-reading contracts through the device
of positing several imaginary readers.
Martha Minow and I both raised concerns about characterizing readers in such a sketchy way.
MaryJoe, nevertheless, stuck to her guns and published the now very famous, landmark article.
See generaL/y MaryJoe Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contract Casebook, 34 AM.
U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
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men's rights.63 Professor Shelley Wright of Australia, for example,
points out the "resolutely and utterly male" language in which human
rights are often discussed: the "Rights of Man" or "Mankind" or "les
droits de lhomme."' She points out that women's rights are
"ghettoized" into their own convention, separate and unequal,
segregated from the "human" issues raised in other rights conven-
tions, and allocated less power in terms of money, staff, procedures,
and length of meeting times.' Finally, she argues that the very idea
of equality itself is premised on the male norm, accepts the validity of
a male standard as "human," and indirectly silences or subverts the
value of specifically female experiences, such as maternity, which men
do not share.66
Challenging various institutions to take women's rights seriously, to
treat women as if they too are human, can be performed in various
styles. Some styles of challenging will be perceived as rude, abrasive,
or unladylike. The institutional response to this style of challenging
may be to dismiss the claims as well as the claimants. Other styles of
challenging may be perceived as naive or ignorant, for example when
feminists assume human rights apply to women and "don't under-
stand" the fine legal nuances between "civil" and "social" law, or the
significance of a "counter claim" based on local customary law.
67
The institutional response may be patronizing, lecturing the naive
little women on the serious technicalities of law, and then dismissing
the claims as well as the claimants.
Challenging is a risky business, because whatever style the challeng-
ers deploy, there is a very substantial risk of rejection, accompanied
by a tendency to "blame the victims" for rudeness or ignorance.
Challenging is risky for feminists as well if we internalize the rejection
and believe that it is our fault for not being smoother or better
educated. It may reinforce notions that women are inferior, and that
women's rights are subordinate to men.
Nevertheless, without challenging, there will be no gains for
women. As African-Americans have long known, it is the Blacks who
simply will not stay "in their place" who fuel the civil rights move-
63. See, e.g., Shelley Wright, Human Rights and Women's Rights: An Analysis of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in HUMAN
RIGHTs IN THE TWENIY-FRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 75.
64. Id. at 77.
65. Id. at 78.
66. Id. at 79-81.
67. The concept of cultural relativism as a "counter claim" to human rights derives from
Professor Karen Engle's work. See Karen Engle, Female Subjects ofPublic InternationalLaw: Human
Rights and the Exotic Other Female, in ForMaiyJoeFsug: A Symposium of Feminist Citical Legal Studies
and Postmodernism, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509, 1513 (1992).
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ments. Issuing legal challenges through the frameworks of interna-
tional legal institutions is one centrally important move available to
feminists.
In the Irish story, the local activists challenged the Irish government
and the European legal institutions to extend human rights already
available to men into a context that is particularly female. Free
speech to obtain information about trade and services that are legal
within the member states of the European Community, and the
freedom to travel within the borders of the European Community, are
not normally difficult or contested human rights in the European
context. The difficulty arises when the specifically female experience
of unwanted pregnancy arises.
A second possible feminist strategic move, which I have labeled
dissecting, analyzes the dichotomy between "civil" and "social" rights
as a replication of the discredited public/private distinction.A
Professor Charlotte Bunch observes:
The division between public and private has largely been used to
uphold a double standard vis a vis women. We accept that the
State has a duty to intervene to counter human rights abuses even
when privately committed, such as slavery or racial segregation
which is not accepted by human rights advocates as a cultural
practice in South Africa or in the South of the USA.69
Professor Frances Olsen's landmark Articles analyzing the pub-
lic/private dichotomy remain the standard in the intellectual history
of contemporary feminist legal theory. She too views the analytical
distinction between civil and social law as a replication of the
public/private dichotomy. The following excerpts from her works
illustrate this concept.
Much of the recent legal scholarship criticizing the pub-
lic/private distinction should be understood as a call to transcend
the state/civil society dichotomy. ... Some theorists have suggested
that we are already entering into a postliberal corporate welfare state society
in which the distinction between the state and civil society has become
blurred.70
Although the woman's sphere has been described as "private"
and contrasted with the "public sphere of the marketplace and
government," such a characterization can be misleading. There are
two different dichotomies involved in this contrast: on one hand,
68. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing traditional discourse within human
rights law focusing on distinction between civil and social rights).
69. Bunch, supra note 1, at 971.
70. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1561 n.242 (1983) (emphasis added).
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a dichotomy between the market, considered public, and the family,
considered private; on the other hand, a dichotomy between the
state, considered public, and civil society, considered private. Both
the market and the family are thought of as part of "private" civil
society in opposition to the "public" state. Calling both the
marketplace and the state "public" can thus confuse our thinking
about the two dichotomies.
71
One of the main things a power-holder gains from successfully
characterizing his power as "private" is a degree of legitimacy and
immunity from attack. Thus it is predictable that people will try to
characterize their use of power as "private" and to characterize
power deployed against them as "not private"-that is, as public,
oppressive, unjustified and unconstitutional. Struggles over power
inform, fuel and permeate the debate over the public/private
dichotomy. At issue is support for or opposition to the status
quo.7
2
In the Irish story, the local activists understood the artificial nature
of the public/private dichotomy, and effectively deployed both types
of international law to pressure the municipal government to allow
free speech and travel for abortion-related purposes. Visualizing the
speech and travel issues as "public" was the obvious move. What I
believe was really creative, and turned out to be centrally important
to the overall Irish story, was constructing the "private" or economic
law move. By bringing the issue of abortion speech and travel into
"hard""3 economic law, the local activists presented a very powerful
but subtle threat to the Irish government. Participation in the
European Economic Community is vitally important to Ireland, which
is among the poorest nations in the EEC. Ireland receives substantial
subsidies from other EEC nations. Thus the sophistication of the
move to private law got the attention of the municipal government.
71. Id. at 1501.
72. Frances E. Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinctior, 10
CoNsT. CoMMENT. 319, 319-20 (1993). Professor Olsen continues:
An actor who can successfully characterize his activity as "private" may gain either
of two quite different constitutional advantages. First, the designation of conduct as
"private" relates to the state action doctrine.... Second, "privacy" may be invoked as
a right which itself provides a substantive limit on state action permitted by the
constitution.
There is also a third important use of characterizing behavior as "private"....
Private may mean personal and domestic, as opposed to commercial; of the family
rather than the marketplace; home rather than work. An actor who can successfully
characterize his activity as "private" in this third sense may... be able to discourage
state action that would inhibit his use of power, on the basis that domestic life should
remain more free of government regulation than other aspects of life.
Id. at 320-21; see also Frances E. Olsen, Unravelling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 109-17
(1989).
73. See supra notes 16, 25-30 and accompanying text.
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The move to economic law also sent a powerful message to the
European Court of Human Rights, which had never taken an
abortion-related case before.74 The European Court of Justice
clearly signaled to the Court of Human Rights its preference that
human rights issues be addressed through the European Human
Rights Convention. Thus, the traditional human rights body received
both support and an impetus from its more powerful counterpart on
the economic-law side.
The third strategic move is what I term transformative. In this type
of move, local activists extend the narrow boundaries of law and
engage directly with the local and international cultures. Most often
this transformative move involves media or education, as well as local
political organizing. The arts, particularly music and visual arts, also
present important and little-explored avenues for transformative
human rights work.
My limited sense of the "cosmopolitan" world of international law
and institutions is that the idea of transforming cultures is very
attractive as long as the transformation "flows down" from the
elevated, sophisticated, internationalists to the more earthbound,
provincial, implicitly backwards corners of the globe. Conversely, my
very limited sense of the "customary" or "traditionalist" local culture
advocates is that they too would like to transform cultures, this time
by accessing international law sources and institutional spaces to
export and expand compliance with their (often religious) agendas.
Transformative cultural moves can also be deployed by human
rights activists, as evidenced by the very successful strategies to combat
South African apartheid through economic, diplomatic, and legal
pressure, but also through the press, rock and roll, visual arts, novels
and poetry, film, and educational courses. In the context of feminist
moves, a transformative strategy was one key factor in the Irish story.
The use of the media was perhaps the most obvious transformative
move. The local Irish press broke the story of the Irish government's
attempts to bar travel to England by the fourteen-year-old rape victim
and her parents. The global press picked up the story immediately
and gave it substantial play. The international furor embarrassed the
Irish government at a delicate moment in the process of ratifying an
important economic treaty with the European Economic Community.
74. The prior abortion case in the European Human Rights system had only risen to the
level of a Commission opinion. The Court of Human Rights itself had never addressed the
question. See supra note 17 (discussing German abortion case, Bruggemann).
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It also conveyed feedback to the Irish public-information about
how the rest of the world views efforts to restrict travel and speech
related to abortion. Importantly, this international feedback
legitimized and lent courage to local activists who were facing a
barrage of religious pressure, including strong anti-abortion state-
ments from Mother Theresa, the Irish Catholic hierarchy, and the
Vatican itself.
The transformative moves were not limited to the press in the Irish
story, nor were they solely centered around the dramatic facts of the
X case. A broadly based cultural and political youth movement,
centering around university student activists who had earlier published
the British telephone numbers in the student directory, had ongoing
transformative power. These brave young men and women had risked
their paltry financial assets, as the Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children moved to recover attorney fees from the students
who lost their case in the European Court ofJustice, and their future
jobs in an attempt to secure the fundamental human rights to speech
and travel for abortion-related purposes.
Portions of the local business community also participated in
transformative moves. The local discotheques and youth-oriented bars
in Dublin collectively and publicly defied Irish law restricting the sale
of condoms by installing condom dispenser machines in their
restrooms on Valentine's Day. No prosecutions were filed by the
Government.
The international business community, however, escaped responsi-
bility. Two potential transformative moves that I unsuccessfully
advocated were attempts to pressure the British medical clinics, which
profit from the Irish trade, to at least fund a portion of the very
expensive attorneys fees in these cases. A second avenue of interna-
tional business that profits from Irish women, yet caved in to pressure,
are the international women's magazines, such as Vogue, Cosmapolitan,
Ell, and others. These magazines carry advertisements for pregnancy
medical services within Europe, including abortion services. They are
normally relatively supportive of women's rights. Under pressure (but
not a court order) from the Irish government, these magazines
nevertheless blacked out the British telephone numbers and allowed
the local students and feminists to take all the expense and all the
risk.
Notorious Irish rock star Sinead O'Connor participated in the
transformations through appearing at public demonstrations in
Dublin. She capped off her bad girl reputation by appearing on the
widely viewed American television show Saturday Night Live, where she
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ripped up a picture of PopeJohn Paul I in a stunning demonstration
of the symbolic power of free political speech. The move was widely
viewed as excessive and in poor taste in both the United States and
Ireland.
Less flamboyant, and more substantively important to Irish women,,
were the transformative moves by local feminist human rights activists
at the pregnancy counselling centers of Open Door Counselling and
the Dublin Well Women Centre. Ruth Riddick, director of the Open
Door center, continued to give the telephone number of British
medical clinics to desperate Irish women who telephoned her at
home. Risking a jail term if she lost her case in the European Court
of Human Rights, Riddick had already sacrificed a promising career
in arts administration to the urgent need for feminist reproductive
activists in Ireland.
Sitting in her comfortable middle-class living room in Dublin, I
flinched when the telephone rang and Ruth excused herself for a few
minutes to take the call. When she returned, I asked her if she was
afraid that she would be prosecuted and jailed for giving out the
British telephone numbers. She shrugged eloquently, pulled down
her mini-skirt and tossed back her mane of deep, red hair. "These
women need help now. We can't very well wait until next year, can
we?"
CONCLUSION
A feminist approach to enforcing human rights, which I describe
as transforming, views the notion of human rights itself as dynamic
and not necessarily confined within the traditional limits of law. The
premise is that as groups struggle to define their own visions of
human rights, they bring new energy and vitality to the human rights
movement itself.75 This transformative, feminist stance acknowledg-
es that in struggling, "new actors" transform themselves through
asserting human rights, while the human rights establishment and the
various legal meanings of human rights are also transformed.
75. Bunch, supra note 1, at 967, 968.
The success and strength of the vision of human rights is reflected in people's
growing identification with it and the desire to extend it to meet their basic needs for
human dignity. The concept of democracy began as something for white Western
propertied males, but the continuous struggles by the rest of us to extend that concept
to include us has given democracy continued importance in the world for several
centuries. So, too, expanding human rights to address the dignity of all people
strengthens, not dilutes, the human rights movement.
Id. at 968.
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A dynamic, transformative approach to human rights is not limited
to "women's issues" such as family planning or reproductive freedom.
Charlotte Bunch notes that twenty years ago there was no recognition
of "disappearances" as a human rights abuse, nor were para-military
or right-wing death squads recognized as violence for which a State
might be held responsible.76 Through the actions of the women of
the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, these issues became part of the
accepted human rights discourse.
Nor does what Professor Karen Engle terms the "counter claim" of
cultural relativism always constitute an insurmountable barrier to
transforming old notions of human rights.77 Racial slavery, apart-
heid, and racial segregation were also once defended as cultural
practices, grounded in society and religion, or beyond official state
policy as a matter of private (de facto) as opposed to public (dejure)
practices.7' These practices are now widely viewed in both interna-
tional and municipal law as violations of human rights.
In describing a transformative, dynamic human rights discourse, I
am explicitly anticipating a great deal of misunderstanding,
miscommunication between women, as well as recognizing that there
will be very real substantive differences in how women approach
various rights issues. I expect that these differences between women
will be especially intense in areas of reproduction that are so deeply
and personally experienced.
I also don't mean to sound overly optimistic about the Irish trilogy.
Whether the Irish experiences have any importance for any other
culture is problematical. Africa, Asia, and Latin America each present
vastly different cultures and issues. I suspect, however, that Ireland
takes its Roman Catholic religion as seriously as any other theocracy.
Ireland is certainly very poor by European standards, and is still
engaged in an internal struggle against what many Irish view as
colonialism.
Whether the changes within Ireland have a broader impact on the
status of women within also remains to be seen. Yet I do think it is
worth spending some effort to tell this Irish story, and to see if clues
about shifting power relations can be gleaned.
The idea of transformative notions of human rights is ultimately an
effort to breathe some life into what are too often cold and bloodless
legal concepts. It is an attempt to recognize that liberty is won
76. See Bunch, supra note 1, at 976.
77. See Engle, supra note 67, at 1513.
78. Bunch, supra note 1, at 971.
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through struggle, not generally handed down in court opinions. The
transformations come through engaging at the local level, I believe,
with an eye toward the international doctrines and institutions, but
with a clear understanding that it is ultimately through cultural
transformation that the status of women must improve.

